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Abstract 
Patent pools and other models of patent collaboration are a 
growing feature of the patent landscape internationally. Patent 
collaboration can be a means of overcoming patent thicket 
problems, avoiding costly patent infringement litigation, reduc­
ing transaction costs and promoting efficiency and innova­
tion. Patent co-operation is also used, commonly as a result 
of some form of regulatory intervention, where there are 
urgent issues of strong public concern. Access to medicines 
and climate change are examples. However, patent collabo­
ration can raise competition law issues. 
This article reviews the models for collaboration interna­
tionally, considers specific examples and considers the appli­
cation of competition law and possible competition law 
barriers to collaboration in the New Zealand context. It 
argues that patent collaboration can now be used as a 
possible approach to promoting innovation in appropriate 
industries in New Zealand. 
I. Introduction
There is growing interest internationally in models for col­
laboration between holders of intellectual property rights, as
a means to foster innovation. In patent law, such collabora­
tion is a response to concerns about the shortcomings of the
patent system, and in particular to problems caused by
patent thickets or patent gridlock, with the patent thickets in
the biotechnology industries being one example. Patent pools
are one model of patent co-operation, but there are a number
of other approaches. Patent sharing is generally for the
purpose of increasing opportunities for innovation, but a
number of patent collaborations also have a wider public
interest purpose, for example to promote innovation in pub­
lic health or technologies to combat climate change. In this
context, regulatory intervention can provide the impetus for
collaboration.
In the past, competition authorities took an unfavourable 
view of patent pools, and collaborations, but this view has 
changed, so that co-operative models are not necessarily 
viewed as anti-competitive internationally. It is likely that 
New Zealand regulators will take a similar approach. 
This article reviews the models for collaboration interna­
tionally, considers specific examples and considers the appli­
cation of competition law and possible competition law 
barriers to collaboration in the New Zealand context. It 
concludes that patent collaboration can now be seen as a 
possible approach to promoting innovation in appropriate 
industries in New Zealand. 
II. Models for Collaboration: Licensing, Patent
Pools, Patent Commons, Open Source and
Other Communities of Innovation
There are a number of models for collaboration by patent 
owners wishing to share their patented technology. These 
include patent pools, patent commons, open source, prefer­
ential licensing, non-assertion pledges or placing a technol­
ogy in the public domain. 
Patent law in New Zealand is covered by the Patents 
Act 1953.2 Patents are property rights, and a patent owner 
has the exclusive right to the patented technology for the 
term of the patent and they also have the right to license that 
technology for use by others. The standard means of allow­
ing others to use the patented technology is therefore to 
license the patent, on terms, typically involving payment, 
agreed between licensor and licensee. For licensing of a single 
patent between two parties, licensing is a highly efficient 
option. However, there are circumstances where licensing is 
less efficient, for example, in high technology industries it is 
common for particular technology to be covered by multiple 
patents held by different companies, described as a "patent 
1. Acknowledgement: This research is part of a wider project sponsored by the Ministry for Business Innovation and
Employment. The authors would like to acknowledge the support of the Ministry in sponsoring this research.
2. The Patents Act 1953 is in the process of reform with a new Patents Bill before Parliament.
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thicket". In these situations, each company requires to use 
other companies' patented invention in order to produce and 
further innovate, so that there are multiple patents and 
multiple potential licensees, and the need for large-scale 
cross-licensing, which can be impractical and inefficient. It is 
these circumstances that led to the development of other 
approaches to collaboration, such as patent pools and patent 
commons. 
Patent Pools and Patent Commons 
Patent Pools are mechanisms whereby patent owners share 
their patented technologies. At their simplest, patent pools 
are based on an agreement by two or more patent owners to 
share and cross-license their patents. Generally agreements 
to pool patents are made between competing companies, 
where each of the companies holds patents necessary to the 
production of a particular product.3 Patents may be comple­
mentary or blocking. Pooled patents are available to mem­
bers of the patent pool, and, in the case of open pools, 
non-members can enter into standard licensing agreements.4 
Patent pools are typically established in these circum­
stances to overcome "patent thicket" problems, also referred 
to as "anticommons" problems, where a gridlock in innova­
tion is caused by the sheer number of patents involved and 
the difficulties of negotiating licences for this patent "thicket" .5 
In these circumstances patent pools can be an efficiency­
enhancing alternative to numerous complex licensing agree­
ments, and, potentially, to costly patent litigation. Patent 
thickets are common in high-technology industries where 
there are potentially hundreds of overlapping patents involved 
in producing a product.6 A patent pool puts in place a pool 
license as a substitute for a property rule requiring individual 
bargaining for each individual transaction.7 Benefits claimed 
for patent pools are increased efficiency through reduced 
transaction costs, clearing blocking positions, and integrat­
ing complementary technologies. 8 In these situations, patent 
sharing through a patent pool can be more about the short­
term goal of avoiding litigation, rather than about promoting 
future innovation in the long term.9 There can nevertheless 
be benefits in facilitating and promoting research and devel­
opment. 
Patent pools are one of a number of collaborative models. 
Patent pools in the sense of a cross-licensing scheme are one 
structure being used for collaboration, but there are other, 
broader, models for collaboration. Similar to patent pools 
are patent commons, which are broader in purpose than 
patent pools, and not limited to cross-licensing agreements 
between competitors. Patent pools are typically focussed on 
obtaining licenses to produce products. Patent commons 
take more various forms, generally accept submissions of 
patents more widely, and in some cases are established not to 
facilitate licensing so much as to promote future innovation 
in areas of public concern, or for philanthropic purposes.10 
Patent commons arrangements generally involve widespread 
use without royalties, but not necessarily cross-licensing in 
the patent pool sense. In the literature, the terms "patent 
pool" and "patent commons" are not necessarily terms of 
art, and are used almost interchangeably by some authors. 
Patent Pools and Patent Commons: Specific 
Examples 
Patent pools are not new, although they are experiencing a 
recent resurgence. Early examples of patent pools include in 
the United States the sewing machine patent pool, the Singer 
machine combination of 1856.11 Also in the United States, 
the Manufacturers Aircraft Association (MAA) was formed 
in 1917. The MAA was a private corporation established 
after government intervention to encourage production of 
airplanes in World War I. Two companies, ("the Wright 
company" and "the Curtiss company") held major patents 
on aircraft technology, and the cost of licensing made air­
plane manufacture very expensive. The companies were ini­
tially reluctant, seeking higher royalties, but after government 
pressure they eventually agreed.12 The MAA established a 
patent pool by entering an agreement with each manufac­
turer under which each agreed to cross-license their patents 
on an essentially royalty-free basis. This led to increased 
airplane manufacture.13 However, the MAA was eventually 
dismantled in 1975 in accordance with a consent decree after 
antitrust regulators alleged antitrust violations.14 The MAA 
was not a purely private initiative to enhance efficiency, it 
was a cross-licensing system imposed by government at the 
time. 
More recently, in the 1990s a patent pool was established 
for the hundreds of patents covering the technology associ­
ated with the MPEG-2 standard format for encoding digital 
video and audio signals. The standard was almost unusable 
3. See discussion in Chase A Marshall, "A Comparative Analysis: Current Solutions to the Anticommons Threat" (2012)
12 Journal of High Technology Law 487 at 500-501 and Michael Madison, Brett Frischmann and Katherine
Strandburg, "Constructing Commons in the Cultural Environment" (2010) 95 Cornell Law Review 657 at 660.
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
4 
See Madison, Frischmann and Strandburg, above, n 3.
See discussion in Michael A Heller and Rebecca S. Eisenberg, "Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in
Biomedical Research" Science May 1 1998, 698. See also Michael Mattioli, "Communities oflnnovation", (2012) 106 North­
western University Law Review 103 at 112-113.
See Richard J Gilbert, "Ties That Bind: Policies to Promote (Good) Patent Pools" (2010) 77 Antitrust Law Journal l.
Ibid.
Marshall, above, n 2 at 501.
See Mattioli, above, n 5 at 120.
See discussion in Marshall, above, n 2 at 500-503.
See Gilbert, above, n 6, fn 12.
Mattioli, above, n 5 at 132.
See Madison, Fri&chmann and Strandburg, above, n 3 at 660-661.
Mattioli, above, n 5, referring to United States v Mfrs. Aircraft Ass'n No. 72-Civ-1307, 1975 WL 814, at 4 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 12 1975). See discussion of competition law issues in patent pools later in this paper.
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because of the patent thicket surrounding it, in which differ­
ent firms between them held hundreds of patents. The solu­
tion was the MPEG patent pool, established in 1997,15 when 
patentees licensed 27 essential patents to the pool to be 
licensed by a single administrator, the MPEG-LA.16 The 
MPEG-LA has since used this model for patent pools in other 
industries facing similar issues.17 
Patent pools have also been used in recent years in con­
texts that raise issues broader than economic efficiency and 
reduced transaction costs. These pools are not simply about 
lowering the cost of the resulting product, but also have 
broader policy goals, and are often the result of direct inter­
vention by policy-makers. For example, there are a number 
of examples of patent pools established in order to encourage 
innovation in medicine and public health, and there is grow­
ing interest in using patent pools for technologies useful in 
combatting climate change. 
An example of a patent pool established to reduce patent 
thicket problems in order to promote public health is the 
Medicines Patent Pool (MPP).18 The MPP was established in 
2010 after having been proposed by civil society groups some 
years earlier, and after suggestions from the World Health 
Organisation.19 The MPP is a public policy response to the 
HIV crisis in the developing world, and its focus is on 
increasing access to HIV medicines in developing countries. 
Industry support was initially weak, and there is still little 
evidence of widespread industry support.20 Government min­
isters and officials from the United States and the United 
Kingdom encouraged the initiative.21 UNITAID, the Interna­
tional Drug Purchase Facility hosted by the World Health 
Organisation, is providing the funding for the Pool under a 
five-year Memorandum of Understanding. The MPP "pools" 
multiple patents related to HIV medicines in one place, 
which are then licensed out by the MPP to cut down on 
transaction costs for all parties involved. This facilitates 
generic manufacture of patented drugs. An additional focus 
is on facilitating the development of new products such as 
fixed-dose combination drugs for treating HIV, in which two 
or more newer medicines are contained in one pill, involving 
working of a number of different patents, and of adapted 
medicines like those that can be used in hot climates without 
refrigeration, and HIV medicines for children.22 Under the 
MPP model, patentees license drug developers in exchange 
for royalties on product sales.23 It is too early to judge the 
success of the MPP initiative, but it is an interesting example 
of a patent pool established to facilitate production of essen­
tial drugs and to facilitate on-going innovation in an area of 
urgent need. 
In the area of climate change there are also efforts to find 
appropriate collaborative structures to share technologies in 
order to develop and disseminate innovations that may assist 
in overcoming the challenges posed to the global community 
by climate change.24 The urgency of the need to combat 
climate change is seen here as a driver for collaboration 
and/or direct regulatory intervention such as compulsory 
licensing of patents. Concerns about the need to disseminate 
expensive technologies to developing countries are also a 
factor. A variety of collaborative approaches have been pro­
posed for climate change technologies, including patent pools, 
patent commons and open source initiatives.25 
One example of a patent pool dealing with climate change 
technologies is the Eco-Patent Commons.26 This variant of a 
patent pool was launched in January 2008 by IBM, Nokia, 
Pitney Bowes and Sony in partnership with the World Busi­
ness Council for Sustainable Development. The concept is 
that "anyone who wants to bring environmental benefits to 
market can use these patents to protect the environment and 
enable collaboration between businesses that foster new 
innovations" .27 The patent pool is open to all, including 
universities, research centres and similar. One hundred eco­
friendly patents have been pledged by thirteen companies in 
a variety of industries: Bosch, Dow, DuPont, Fuji-Xerox, 
Hitachi, HP, IBM, Nokia, Pitney Bowes, Ricoh, Sony, Taisei 
and Xerox. The number of patents each business wishes to 
15. The patentees forming the pool initially were the Trustees of Columbia University, Fujitsu Limited, General Instrument
Corp., Lucent Technologies Inc., Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd., Mitsubishi Electric Corp., Philips Electronics
N.V. (Philips), Scientific Atlanta, Inc., and Sony Corp. (Sony). See J Clark, J Piccolo, B Stanton and K Tyson, Patent
Pools: A Solution to the Problem of Access in Biotechnology Patents? (December 5, 2000) at 4.
16. See Richard J Gilbert, above, n 6 at 5. See also J Clark, J Piccolo, B Stanton and K Tyson, Patent Pools: A Solution to
the Problem of Access in Biotechnology Patents? (December 5, 2000) 13. The MPEG patent pool only accepted
essential patents, in the sense that the patent had to be infringed by the defined technology. See http://www.uspto.gov/
we bi offices/pac/ da pp/ op la/pa tentpool. pdf.
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
See http://www.mpegla.com/main/Pages/About.aspx.
See http://www.medicinespatentpool.org/.
See World Health Organisation, Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual
Property, 24 May 2008, see http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/A61/A61_R21-en.pdf.
Mattioli, above, n 5 at 123-124.
Ibid at 125.
See explanation at http://www.medicinespatentpool.org/what-we-do/how-it-works/.
Mattioli, above, n 5 at 121-125
See generally Antony Taubman, "Sharing Technology to Meet a Global Challenge: Navigating Proposals for Patent
Pools, Patent Commons and Open Innovation" WIPO Magazine (March 2009). See http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/
en/2009/02/article_0002.html.
Ibid at 2-3.
See http://www.wbcsd.org/work-prograrn/capacity-building/eco-patent-commons.aspx. See also discussion in Michael
A. Carrier, "An Antitrust Framework For Climate Change" (2011) 9 Northwestern Journal of Technology and
Intellectual Property 513 at 526-528 and in Mattioli, above, n 5 at 142-145.
See http://www.wbcsd.org/work-program/capacity-building/eco-patent-commons/overview.aspx.
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pledge to the Commons is left to its discretion. The patents 
pledged should provide environmental benefits such as energy 
conservation or efficiency and pollution prevention.28 Pat­
ents included in the Eco-Patent Commons are:29 
... subject to a covenant, or pledge, not to assert the patent 
against implementers' environmentally beneficial use of 
the pledged patent(s). That is, subject to defensive actions ... , 
the patent holders shall not assert their pledged patents 
against an implementer's infringing machines, manufac­
tures, processes, or compositions of matter that alone, or 
when in a larger product or service, achieve environmen­
tally beneficial results. 
Under this model patents are therefore freely available for 
environmentally beneficial use, without royalties. 
Another example of a patent collaboration in the climate 
change area is the Green Xchange, which aims to "accelerate 
and scale sustainability-innovation through sharing intellec­
tual property assets". 30 Green Xchange is structured differ­
ently from the Eco-Patent Commons. The Green Xchange 
provides a standardized patent license structure, so that 
patentees can control what levels and to whom their patents 
are available. It offers three standard license options, there­
fore reducing negotiation and transaction costs. 31 It also
aims to facilitate asset exchange and collaboration.32 
Patent pools as generally understood are therefore only 
one of a number of collaborative models currently being 
discussed and trialled as responses to global crises such as 
access to essential medicines and the threat of climate change. 
In these cases, the perceived urgent need for innovation is 
spurring collaborative efforts. 
Open Source Model of Collaboration 
Another model of collaboration is open source, based on the 
open source software model, but used to refer to a shared 
technological platform for innovation. 33 The open-source
movement of the 1980s onward originated the concept of a 
common platform, leading to projects such as the Linux 
operating system. The threat of patent infringement litiga­
tion led a group of Linux based software companies to agree 
not to sue one another for patent infringement. This led to 
the creation of the intellectual property company Open Inven­
tion Network in 2005.34 According to the Open Invention
Network website, the company "acquires patents and makes 
them available royalty-free to any company, institution or 
individual that agrees not to assert its patents against the 
Linux System" .35 Patents owned by the Open Invention
Network can be used royalty-free by any company, institu­
tion or individual that agrees not to assert its patents against 
the Linux System.36 It is a system of non-assertion pledges
which aims to defend Linux users against patent infringe­
ment suits, and thereby encourage firms to invest in Linux 
and to thereby encourage further innovation.37 It has indus­
try support including financial backing from companies includ­
ing IBM, NEC, Novell, Philips, Red Hat and Sony.38 This
system of non-assertion pledges shares important features 
with the Eco-Patent Commons. 
Other Models for Collaboration 
There are also other models for collaboration. These include 
systems for preferential licensing for certain uses or users, 
such as in developing countries. 39 There are also non­
assertion pledges in respect of particular uses or users, or in 
particular circumstances. 40 One example here is the Patent
Commons Project.41 This project seeks pledges from holders
of software patents under which the patentee makes a com­
mitment not to enforce software patents against open source 
software or standards, and by reserving the right to assert 
them against people making intellectual property claims 
against open source software, developers and users. 42 
28. Ibid. See also Antony Taubman, above, n 24. See http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2009/02/article_0002.html.
29. Eco-Patent Commons ground rules available at http://www.wbcsd.org/work-prograrn/capacity-building/eco-patent-
commons.aspx.
30. See website at http://greenxchange.cc/info/about.
31. http://greenxchange.cc/info/about. See also discussion in Carrier, above, n 26 at 528 and in Mattioli, above, n 5
at 145-147.
32. http://greenxchange.cc/info/about.
33. Antony Taubman, "Sharing Technology to Meet a Global Challenge: Navigating Proposals for Patent Pools, Patent
34. 
35. 
36. 
39. 
Commons and Open Innovation" WIPO Magazine (March 2009) 3. See http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2009/
02/article_0002.html.
See Michael Mattioli, above, ri 5 at 135.
See Open Invention Network website at http://www.openinventionnetwork.com/patents.php.
Ibid. The Open Invention Network purchases patents for all areas of software useful in protecting the Linux System.
The license agreement is at http://www.openinventionnetwork.com/pat_license_agreement.php.
http://www.openinventionnetwork.com/about.php.
See Michael Mattioli, above, n 5 at 136-13 7. See also the Open Invention Network website http://www.openinventionnetwork.com/ 
about.php.
Antony Taubman, "Sharing Technology to Meet a Global Challenge: Navigating Proposals for Patent Pools, Patent
Commons and Open Innovation" WIPO Magazine (March 2009) 2. See http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2009/
02/article_0002.html.
40. Antony Taubman, "Sharing Technology to Meet a Global Challenge: Navigating Proposals for Patent Pools, Patent
Commons and Open Innovation" WIPO Magazine (March 2009) 2. See http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2009/
02/article_0002.html.
41. See http://www.patentcommons.org/about/index. php.
42. See http://www.patentcommons.org/about/support. php.
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There is also always the option of placing patents into the 
public domain, although it is not clear why a company would 
pay patent application and maintenance costs in order to 
place the patent in the public domain. 43 There are therefore a
variety of approaches to establishing frameworks for collabo­
ration for innovation, or forms of constructed cultural com­
mons. 44
Impetus for Collaboration 
The above review demonstrates that patent collaborations 
are established for a variety of reasons. Patentees may them­
selves establish a patent pool in order to avoid patent thicket 
problems. Collaborative systems such as non-assertion pledges 
can be motivated by the desire to find a defence to litigation. 
Sharing of patents also takes place where there is government 
intervention or intervention by international officials or policy­
makers, or civil society groups.45 Regulatory intervention to
encourage patent-sharing is a relatively non-intrusive approach 
to promoting collaboration. A more direct approach could 
see policy-makers actually fund and establish a patent­
sharing regime. Compulsory licensing is also a possible, if 
unpopular, intervention, but compulsory licensing is restricted 
under the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights Agree­
ment Articles, 30-31.46
A number of recent patent pool initiatives have been in a 
context of urgent policy need, and patent collaboration has 
resulted from some form of government and policy-makers 
intervention. In general, these collaborative efforts are delib­
erately designed rather than being the product of a process of 
evolution as a product of property-based market transac­
tions by private actors.47
Do these patent pools and other collaborative arrange­
ments constructed for reasons of public policy actually work 
effectively and achieve the policy or philanthropic goals for 
which they were established? For a number of the examples 
discussed, it is probably too early to tell. The MPP was 
established by international organisations outside the indus­
try, and it has public sector support. Whether it will be 
successful in improving access to and encouraging develop­
ment of new HIV/AIDS drugs remains to be seen.48 The
situation is similar to the Eco-Patent Commons and Green 
43. See discussion in Mattioli, above, n 5 at 145-147.
Xchange. In both cases it is too early to measure success. For 
the Eco-Patents Commons, it will be difficult to measure 
success at any time, because there is no system for identifying 
whether licenses are actually being used. 49 In both cases, the
incentives to companies to contribute patents are a little 
unclear. It has been suggested that motivation may be purely 
philanthropic, or that philanthropy may be mixed with the 
desire to use the projects as a means to selling complementary 
goods or to encourage adoption of certain technological 
standards. 50
Ill. Competition Law Issues 
Patent pools involve collaboration, and commonly collabo­
ration between competitors. Any collaboration between com­
petitors raises the potential for competitive harm, and therefore 
raises issues of competition law and policy. 
Patent pools that limit competition between competitors 
will potentially breach the provisions of the New Zealand 
Commerce Act 1986, particularly s 27 which proscribes 
contracts, arrangements or understandings that have the 
purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening com­
petition in a market. There is also the potential for patent 
pools to breach the s 30 price-fixing provisions, if the agree­
ment is between competitors or potential competitors and if 
the cross-license provisions have the purpose, effect or likely 
effect of controlling or maintaining the price of goods.51
There is no New Zealand case law on specific patent pool 
arrangements and the applicability of the Commerce Act 1986, 
but guidance can be drawn from other jurisdictions, particu­
larly the United States and Europe. 
Patent pools in which competitors' agreements inhibit 
competition between substitute products or technologies, 
whether made and sold by members of the pool or by 
licensees of the pool, are likely to breach s 2 7. 52 In this
situation, firms that would otherwise compete in selling 
substitute products are instead agreeing not to compete. 
Patent pools are also likely to contravene if they exclude 
legitimate competition by those not part of the pool.53 The
ability of members to license outside of the pool will then be 
a factor in determining competition harm. Pool licenses may 
also contain terms that otherwise limit competition, or limit 
44. In Madison, Frischmann and Strandburg, above, n 3 at 659 the authors examine various forms of "constructed cultural
commons", using that term to mean "environments for developing and distributing cultural and scientific knowledge
through institutions that support pooling and sharing that knowledge in a managed way". These environments are
designed and managed rather than left to evolve through market transactions grounded solely in property rights.
45. Mattioli, above, n 5. This article examines the theory that patent sharing is a form of market self-correction in which
private actors overcome anticommons problems by coordinated private action in the form of patent sharing. The
implication of this theory is that the market self-corrects and that there is no need for regulatory intervention. However,
Mattioli's analaysis concludes that the reality is much more complex, and that, among other things, these communities
cannot be expected to form without government support.
46. See discussion in Mattioli, above, n 5 at 152-153.
47. Madison, Frischmann and Strandburg, above, n 3 at 659.
48. Mattioli, above, n 5 at 125.
49. Mattioli, above, n 5 at 145.
50. Mattioli, above, n 5 at 145.
51. See the brief discussion in Matt Sumpter, New Zealand Competition Law and Policy (2010), 340-341.
52. See Gilbert, above, n 6.
53. Antony Taubman, "Sharing Technology to Meet a Global Challenge: Navigating Proposals for Patent Pools, Patent
Commons and Open Innovation" WIPO Magazine (March 2009) 2. See http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2009/
02/article_0002.html.
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competition in other non-patented products. There is also 
potential for patent pool arrangements to form the basis for 
cartel behaviour, providing opportunities and mechanisms 
for members to agree on matters such as price and to allocate 
products and territories.54 
In the United States, patent pools have historically attracted 
the interest of antitrust authorities, and continue to do so in 
some circumstances. It is true that a number of early patent 
pools were established to avoid competition.55 However, 
more recently United States antitrust authorities have recognised 
that some patent pools have pro-competitive benefits and 
can enhance innovation. According to the 1995 Antitrust
Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property,56 cross­
licensing and pooling arrangements "may provide procompeti­
tive benefits by integrating complementary technologies, reducing 
transaction costs, clearing blocking positions, and avoiding 
costly infringement litigation. By promoting the dissemina­
tion of technology, cross-licensing and pooling arrangements 
are often procompetitive".57 The United States Department 
of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission have also 
expressly recognised the benefits of patent pools in overcom­
ing the problems of patent thickets, and that they may 
"mitigate royalty stacking and hold-up problems that can 
occur when multiple patent holders individually demand 
royalties from a licensee".ssg 
However, the United States antitrust authorities continue 
to take the view that cross-licensing and pooling arrange­
ments can have anticompetitive effects in certain circum­
stances. These include collective price or output restraints as 
part of the pooling agreement, exclusion of a competitor by 
pool members who collectively possess market power or 
exclusion of a competitor from the pool with the effect that 
they cannot effectively compete in the market for a good 
incorporating the licensed technologies. 59 Pool arrangements 
may also have anticompetitive effects if the arrangement 
deters or discourages participants from engaging in research 
and development and thus retarding innovation, such as an 
arrangement requiring members to license current and future 
technology at minimal cost which may reduce incentives to 
research and development.60 In their 2007 report, the anti­
trust agencies noted that:61 
Pooling arrangements typically warrant greater antitrust 
scrutiny than do cross-licensing agreements due to the 
collective pricing of pooled patents, greater possibilities 
for collusion, and generally a larger number of market 
participants. 
The Agencies concluded as follows:62 
• The Agencies will continue to evaluate the competitive
effects of cross licenses and patent pools under the
framework of the Antitrust-IP Guidelines. Given the
cognizable benefits and potential anticompetitive effects
associated with both of these licensing practices, the
Agencies typically will analyse both types of agree­
ments under the rule of reason.
• Combining complementary patents within a pool is
generally procompetitive.
• Including substitute patents in a pool does not make
the pool presumptively anticompetitive; competitive
effects will be ascertained on a case-by-case basis.
• The competitive significance of a pool's licensing terms
will be analysed on a case-by-case basis considering
both their procompetitive benefits and anticompetitive
effects.
• The Agencies will not generally assess the reasonable­
ness of royalties set by a pool. The focus of the Agen­
cies' analysis is on the pool's formation and whether its
structure would likely enable pool participants to impair
competition.
This summarises the current views of United States antitrust 
regulators, and these views are likely to be given weight by 
the New Zealand Commerce Commission and by the New Zealand 
courts in any consideration of patent pools in a competition 
law context. While patent pools are viewed more favourably 
by competition authorities today than they were before the 
1990s, the risk that competition authorities may oppose a 
patent pool arrangement must be taken into account in 
devising an appropriate model. 
IV. Conclusion
Patent collaboration has become an established feature of the 
patent landscape, as a means of promoting innovation, and is 
likely to be more common in the New Zealand context. 
Patent collaboration has potential benefits. In industries 
heavily subject to current patent protection, there is the 
potential to encounter patent thicket problems. A patent 
pool model can reduce transaction costs, increase efficiency 
and at least potentially increase the speed of innovation. 
Patent pools can also reduce the risks of costly patent infringe­
ment litigation, which is a benefit to all companies involved, 
but a particular benefit for small to medium sized businesses 
which are less able to absorb the costs of litigation. Industries 
54. See, Gilbert, above, n 6, giving the example of the case United States v National Lead Company 63 F. sup. 513, 518
(S.D.N. Y. 1945), aff'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947) at fn 23.
55. Above, n 52. Examples are listed in fn12.
5t United States Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of
Intellectual Property ( 199 5) http://www. j ustice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/05 5 8.htm. 
57. Ibid, at [5.5).
58. United States Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property
Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition (April 2007), 8. See http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/hearings/ip/
222655.pdf.
59. United States Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of
Intellectual Property (1995) at 28-29. See http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.htm.
60. Ibid at 29.
61. Above, n 58 at 9.
62. Ibid.
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such as infrastructure industries that have "commons" char­
acteristics are particularly suited to collaborative initiatives. 
Similarly, co-operation is appropriate where there are urgent 
issues of strong public concern. Access to medicines and 
climate change are both significantly urgent issues requiring 
a concerted international response. While there are competi-
New Zealand Intellectual Property Journal September 2013 
tion law risks in patent collaboration, competition authori­
ties now take a more nuanced approach and recognise that 
there may be procompetitive effects. Patent collaboration 
can now be seen as a possible approach to promoting inno­
vation internationally, and as a means of promoting innova­
tion in appropriate industries in New Zealand. 
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